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RICHARD A. BOOTH*
What Is a Business Crime?
WHY DO WE DECIDE TO CRIMINALIZE SOME OFFENSES WHILE OTHER offenses are left
to lesser remedies? The answer should be simple: we should criminalize actions only
when less drastic sanctions do not deter those actions. The principle that criminal-
ization should be the last resort may not need further explanation. It seems obvious
that it is more efficient to rely on private remedies when they work. Why use public
resources to prosecute and punish offenses that private litigants can handle? More-
over, in a civil action the point is to make whole the victim of the offense.' In a
criminal action, compensation is at best an afterthought (and at worst a distrac-
tion).2 Finally, it is more consistent with a government of limited powers to rely on
the criminal law only when all else fails.' That is what freedom-and free enter-
prise-are all about. Nevertheless, there currently seems to be some sort of pre-
sumption at work that where there is a wrong there ought to be a criminal law to
punish the wrongdoer.
There are many forms of business crimes. The focus here is on the relatively new
subset of business crimes that has emerged in connection with corporate govern-
ance and securities regulation. In general, the subject matter is an extension of
fiduciary duty.4 That is, the ultimate issue is whether the directors, officers, or
agents of a corporation are guilty of a breach of trust vis d vis investors or the
corporation itself.5 To be sure, there is an ambiguity here. It is not clear that a
Martin G. McGuinn Professor of Business Law, Villanova University School of Law.
1. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795, 1809 (1992) (noting that one of the "[tiwo paradigmatic remedies" available through civil law is "the
court order mandating a return to the status quo ante, so as to make the injured party whole[,] .... [t]he
second (being] the order to pay money as compensation for damage caused").
2. See id. at 1799, 1806-09 (explaining that the original purpose of criminal law sanctions was to punish
and deter public wrongs, regardless of whether an individual person suffered an injury, while civil law devel-
oped to compensate private individuals for actual damage to their interests).
3. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 31; Mann, supra note 1, at 1811, 1850-53 (highlighting the differences between
civil and criminal law as well as exploring Congress's tendency to apply civil law over criminal law). Criminal
law "should be reserved for the most damaging wrongs and the most culpable defendants." Mann, supra note I,
at 1863.
4. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (explaining that insider trading liability is
based on a breach of fiduciary duty).
5. Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEo. L.J. 1733, 1734
(1994). "The procedural form of a shareholder suit depends on whether managers are said to have harmed the
corporation or instead its shareholders in the first instance." Id.
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corporation has any interests independent of its investors' interests. But leaving that
puzzle aside for the moment, it is worth noting that the investors in question are
almost always the stockholders.6 There are relatively few cases-civil or criminal-
in which the interests of creditors or other constituencies are the focus.7 So the
question is: what do stockholders want the law to do? The answer depends on the
nature of the offense.
I. THE VARIETIES OF CIVIL REMEDIES
Civil remedies come in many shapes and sizes. There are few offenses that cannot
be effectively addressed by one of three forms of civil remedies: simple damages,'
punitive and multiple damages,9 and class and derivative actions. °
A. Simple Damages (and No Damages)
Simple damages are enough to deter most offenses. If the offense arises from inad-
vertence or even recklessness and does not involve gain to the culprit, a civil action
for a simple monetary remedy should suffice." If the culprit cannot gain from the
offense, a simple monetary remedy is sufficient to deter bad behavior. 2
There is a danger that a simple monetary remedy may be too much in some
cases.' 3 As a matter of state corporation law, the business judgment rule and the
ability of a corporation to absolve management of liability in negligence mean that
6. See id. at 1733. "Shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of
corporate managers.- Id.
7. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413, 413 n.1 (1986)
(providing a description of the position of bondholders and other creditors in the corporate realm in compari-
son to that of stockholders). Unlike the rights of stockholders, the rights of bondholders and other creditors are
not protected against corporate abuses and thus there are few interests able to be brought before the court. Id.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.C. Admittedly, class actions and derivative actions are not remedies technically speak-
ing, but they are procedures that afford access to a remedy when it might otherwise be impractical for a
plaintiff to pursue it.
11. By "simple monetary remedy," I mean compensatory damages, restitution, disgorgement, and the like.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 315-52
(1991) (providing a thorough discussion of remedies available in corporate law cases).
12. Lynch, supra note 3, at 32, 40. "Because such crimes are typically committed for financial gain, by
people who often have significant economic resources, the use of fines has seemed to many an adequate deter-
rent." Id. at 32. To be sure, there are many forms of gain. Monetary gain is the most obvious. But it may be
another form of gain simply to keep a business afloat. Although intangible benefits may motivate some bad
behavior, requiring a threshold showing of tangible benefit would filter out dubious cases.
13. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 334-35. Easterbrook and Fischel present a hypo-
thetical in which a manager proclaims that his firm will soon be worth billions, which in turn causes the firm's
stock to increase dramatically. Shortly thereafter, the manager admits that his proclamation was a "false alarm"
and the price drops back down to the "original level." Id. at 334. The people who bought stocks during the
interval in which it was believed that the firm was worth billions would at this point be faced with great loss.
The manager and firm would not have financially benefited from the situation. In this scenario, "[a] rule that
required the firm to compensate the buyers for their full loss would impose damages far in excess of the net
harm." Id. at 335.
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managers cannot be held liable for mere mistakes of judgment.'4 Stockholders have
no remedy in such cases. But a rational stockholder does not want a remedy in such
cases. By holding a diversified portfolio of stocks, a stockholder can eliminate the
risk of good faith mistakes of judgment.' Because stockholders can insure them-
selves effectively through diversification, they should be opposed to wasteful litiga-
tion by other stockholders seeking recovery in such circumstances. Diversification
works for stockholders because the goal of a business is to make money 6 and be-
cause business does in fact make money in the aggregate. 7 As long as the decision
or behavior in question is part of a good faith effort to further that goal, a stock-
holder has no complaint.' On the other hand, if the bad act is one that subtracts
money from the pot-on purpose-stockholders have a legitimate complaint. 9
The business judgment rule only applies to business decisions made in good
faith. If a decision is made other than in good faith and gives rise to losses, a
manager may be held liable for the harm done to the corporation." If a decision is
tainted by conflict of interest, the manager may be required to disgorge any ill-
gotten gains or may be required to restore the corporation to the status it would
14. See, e.g., id. at 93 (acknowledging that the business judgment rule absolves managers from liability
even when they act negligently).
15. See id. at 28-30 (defining diversification as having an "investment in the economy as a whole" and
explaining that such diversification allows investors to concern themselves with the value maximization of firms
in the entirety instead of the value maximization of individual firms, which therefore eliminates the risks
associated with individual firms).
16. See id. at 120 ("When there is competition, investors agree that the corporation should have the objec-
tive of maximizing wealth because greater wealth gives them the ability to consume or rejuggle their portfolios
to yield greater returns. ... ). Although investors may not always prefer the wealth maximization in every
corporate decision, the overall objective is to increase wealth.
17. See id. at 121 (relating diversification to the idea of how businesses in the aggregate make money by
providing an example of an investor whose stock in an individual firm is near worthless while the aggregate of
his investments in multiple firms is financially profitable).
18. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Af-
fects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429, 437-38 (1998); see also EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 11, at
93-100 (detailing the interests of the stockholders and how they tend to react to corporate decisions and
behavior affecting those interests).
19. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
1 (2007) [hereinafter Booth, End of Securities Fraud]. Creditors and other stakeholders are in a different boat.
They do not gain when a company increases in value. See McDaniel, supra note 7, at 418-19, 435. But they can
lose when a company loses value. Id. This is no great insight. It is well known among scholars of corporation
law. See id. The point is that the interests of stockholders and other constituencies conflict. Accordingly, the
conventional wisdom is that creditors and other constituencies must protect themselves by contract. Id. at 413
n.1; see also Richard A. Booth, The Duty to Creditors Reconsidered-Filling a Much Needed Gap in Corporation
Law, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 415, 416 (2007) [hereinafter Booth, Duty to Creditors]. And there are few cases in
which creditors have succeeded in connection with a claim that they have been harmed by business decisions
intended to benefit the stockholders. A fortiori, it is quite difficult to say such a decision should ever be seen as
a crime. Booth, Duty to Creditors, supra at 416 n.7.
20. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 130, 134 (1979). "[lin
the absence of the business judgment defense, [which does not apply in situations indicating a lack of good
faith,[ directors are liable to the corporation for losses sustained by the corporation because of knowingly
illegal conduct." Id. at 130.
VOL. 3 NO. 1 2008
WHAT IS A BUSINESS CRIME?
have enjoyed if the transaction never happened.' Although different from simple
damages, these remedies are still simple remedies that merely seek to restore the
parties to their former state.
Similarly, federal securities law relies on simple remedies for the most part.22
Indeed, it is noteworthy that federal securities law expressly prohibits awarding
damages in excess of actual loss.23 On the other hand, the business judgment rule
does not apply in connection with claims arising under federal securities law.24
Under the Securities Act of 1933,2" an issuer is absolutely liable if there is a mis-
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with an offering of securi-
ties.26 In essence, investors can demand a refund if they have been misled in
connection with an offering of securities. 7 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
governs trading in securities.2" Here a plaintiff must allege and prove that the de-
fendant acted with scienteri9-some level of intent to defraud.3 ° This requirement
is similar in a way to the business judgment rule. A mere mistake does not give rise
to liability.3' But the scienter requirement is different from the business judgment
21. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 333-35; see also Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 861
(9th Cir. 2003) (ordering defendants to be disgorged because the public needed to be protected from their
deceptive tactics in selling municipal bonds and other securities), amended by 335 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2003).
22. See Arnold S. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093 (1977) (offering a
thorough discussion of available remedies under federal security laws); see also Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The gist of the Rule lob-5 action for damages is economic injury to the plaintiff
resulting proximately from the acts of the defendant[ J ....").
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000). Section 28(a) provides:
[TIhe rights and remedies provided by [the 1934 Act] shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for
damages under the provisions of [the 1934 Act] shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained
of ... [N]othing in [the 1934 Act] shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it
does not conflict with the provisions of [the 1934 Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder.
24. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979) (holding that federal policy disallows the application of the
business judgment rule to suits involving federal securities laws violations); Laurie C. Nelson, Note, Judgment
Day for the Business Judgment Rule, Galef v. Alexander, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 1169, 1170, 1172-91 (1981) (noting
that the Second Circuit ruling in Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980), laid the groundwork for the
argument that the policy underlying section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is "so significant that
any business judgment rule dismissal ... would likewise violate the statute and should not be permitted").
25. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (2000 & Supp. IV
2006)).
26. Id. § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k; see also Harold F. Lusk, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV.
1162, 1164 (1934).
27. See Securities Act of 1933 § 1 I(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
29. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506-12 (2007).
30. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 343-44 (explaining how the intent to defraud require-
ment relates to rules on damages).
31. See Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 654 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that a
successful complaint in a securities fraud case must state specific facts that show a "strong inference" that
defendant acted with scienter); Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 1991) (specifying that clear reckless-
ness is required to hold defendant liable in securities fraud case where duty to disclose is concerned); SEC v.
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rule in that it does not matter if a misstatement or omission was prompted by a
valid business purpose.
32
B. Punitive Damages & Multiple Damages
The situation is complicated if the culprit stands to gain from the offense. For
example, in the case of insider trading, the culprit may not be deterred by the
prospect of simple damages. 3 If the culprit is caught, he must disgorge the profit. If
not, he keeps the profit. It seems fair to assume that sometimes the culprit will get
away with it. So there is no reason not to give it a go. 4 Similarly, a broker may be
tempted to engage in excessive trading in customer accounts in order to generate
commissions-a practice known as churning.3" As with insider trading, it is not
clear that simple damages will work to deter churning. The broker will reckon that
he can simply pay back his ill gotten gains if he gets caught.
Although simple damages will not deter insider trading or churning, punitive
damages or something similar should work. The problem with simple damages is
that insider trading and churning are both offenses from which the culprit stands
to gain and that may not be detected or pursued by the victim.36 So the solution is
to award some multiple of damages based on the likelihood that victims will sue,
thus eliminating the potential for profit.3 For example, if only one-third of insider
trading cases are detected, then the culprit should be required to pay damages equal
to three times the gain. Accordingly, the Insider Trading & Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988 3 (ITSFEA) (like its predecessor the Insider Trading Sanc-
Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that where defendant made a mistake regarding alloca-
tion of certain cable stocks, he did not intentionally or recklessly defraud clients).
32. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1368 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that "the presence or
absence of a business purpose has no bearing on [defendant's] liability for defrauding the sellers"), rev'd on
other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
33. See Comment, A Role for the 10-b Private Action, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 460, 484-85 (1981) (arguing that
absent an additional punishment such as negative publicity or payment of plaintiffs' attorney's fees, mere
disgorgement of "ill-gotten profits" will not deter a defendant from insider trading).
34. Id. Of course, this reasoning ignores other consequences, such as the cost of litigation or the possibility
that one will get fired. In some cases, agents who fear they are in the "last period of employment," for financial
reasons or otherwise, may be more likely to commit fraud. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious
Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 724-27.
35. See Note, Churning By Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869, 869 (1967) (explaining that churning
occurs when a dealer acts in his own interest rather than the customer's interests and "induces transactions in
the customer's account which are excessive in size and frequency in light of the character of the account"). As
Woody Allen once said: "A stockbroker is someone who takes all your money and invests it until it's all gone."
See Europe's Small Shareholders. Unloved?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1997, at 83.
36. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section
16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 313 (1989) (discussing efficient deterrence of insider trading).
37. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 777, 787 (1987) (stating that "multiplying actual damages is necessary because some violations of the
antitrust laws go undetected").
38. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 4678 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 (2000)).
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tions Act of 198431 (ITSA)), provides for up to a triple-the-gain fine for insider
trading in addition to disgorgement of profit. Moreover, punitive damages are
quite common in churning cases (albeit as a matter of pendent state law claims for
breach of fiduciary duty or fraud).4 °
The argument for multiple damages raises a question about cases arising under
the Securities Act of 1933. A public offering affords an opportunity for gain. Why is
there no need for multiple damages under the 1933 Act? There are several answers.
There is almost no chance that an offense will not be detected because market
prices are readily available following a public offering of stock. And the victims will
almost always sue because the 1933 Act affords an issuer no defenses. Finally, it
seems less likely that an offender under the 1933 Act would engage in repeat
offenses.4'
C. Class Actions & Derivative Actions
While punitive damages fix the problem of harms that are difficult to detect or
pursue, some claims are too small to justify legal action by any single plaintiff. The
solution is a class action or derivative action. Indeed, virtually all securities fraud
actions are maintained as class actions.4 Class actions address the problem of indi-
vidual claims that are too small to justify legal action by any single plaintiff.4 3
One danger with class actions is that plaintiffs may seek (and courts may award)
punitive damages on the simplistic rationale that they would be appropriate in an
individual action. But punitive damages make no sense in a class action if the pri-
mary rationale for punitive damages is that plaintiffs are reluctant to sue because of
39. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78); see
Jerry Edward Farmer, Note, The Role of Treble Damages in Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Deter Insider
Trading, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1984) (stating that the Insider Trading Sanctions Act "would
authorize the SEC to seek treble damages from inside traders in addition to the SEC's current injunctive
powers").
40. See, e.g, Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1227 (8th Cir. 1990);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 332 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that a jury award in the "three-times-
compensatory-damages ballpark" was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion); Michael Siconolfi, NASD Is
Developing Guidelines for Punitive Awards to Investors, WALL ST. j., June 7, 1991, at C1. One problem is that the
culprit may be effectively judgment-proof with regard to any penalty. Richard A. Booth, Damages in Churning
Cases, 20 SEC. REG. L.]. 3, 19-20 (1991). That is, the culprit may have little net worth in addition to the ill-
gotten gains. And indeed ill-gotten gains may have been dissipated. Id. Another problem is that under ITSFEA,
the government keeps the money. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, § 21A(d)(1), 102 Stat. 4677.
41. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). See generally Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings
and Professional Sports Teams: The Regulations Work, But Are Owners and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 139, 155 (2000) (noting corporations' tendencies to use "extreme caution" to prepare required disclo-
sure materials because of "the Act's imposition of liability upon the corporation for omissions or material
misrepresentations"). To be sure, underwriters are also liable under the 1933 Act and they are by definition
repeat players.
42. See LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SET-
TLEMENTS: 2006 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2006).
43. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 497 (1997).
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small claims." Moreover, the allure of class actions is such that it induces plaintiffs
and plaintiff's attorneys to seek out claims.
In some cases, a derivative works better than a class action." For example, in an
insider trading case, the culprit may have made a significant profit, but when that
profit is disgorged and spread over hundreds or thousands of trades, the recovery
to any one individual will be miniscule. 6 Indeed, the cost of administering the
claims may exceed the recovery.47 On the other hand, if the issuer recovers, the
claim is easy to administer and the stockholders are made whole by the slight in-
crease in the value of the issuer.48
II. THE PROPER ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW
What does this leave for criminal law to do in the area of corporate governance and
securities regulation? Perhaps not much. But it is possible to imagine cases that are
not addressed well by lesser remedies. If the culprit causes harm that is dispropor-
tionate to the gain (or potential for gain), a criminal sanction may be the only
remaining remedy.49
One possible example that comes to mind is the fraud at Enron."° Suppose the
plan there was simply to report false income to induce investors to buy the stock
and raise its price so that insiders could cash out their stock options. Specifically,
suppose the idea was to suck in (say) $10 billion in new investment dollars (that
could have gone to other ventures) to create a gain of $50 million on stock options.
Such a case might be a legitimate occasion for criminal prosecution. The scheme
44. The same is true with regard to the award of punitive damages in arbitration. See Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795-96 (N.Y. 1976) (explaining why public policy prohibits punitive damages for
private wrongs).
45. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57
VAND. L. REv. 1747, 1774 (2004) (discussing the benefits of derivative suits with public company defendants);
see also Booth, End of Securities Fraud, supra note 19, at 27 ("The practical question for a court is whether a
securities fraud action is direct or derivative. The answer depends on whether the harm is primarily to the
corporation or to individual stockholders and whether recovery should go to the corporation or individual
stockholders.").
46. See Cox, supra note 43, at 497.
47. See id.
48. Booth, End of Securities Fraud, supra note 19, at 9-10, 27. Nevermind that the identity of the stock-
holders may have changed. If they are diversified it all comes out in the wash. Id. at 9.
49. This approach to the definition of crime may be seen as an extension of the notion that liability ought
to lie with the party who can most cheaply avoid the harm. I am tempted to call this the principle of criminal
indifference, the offense with which the characters of Seinfeld were charged in the final episode. Although the
concept is sound, it may describe some acts and practices that are not likely to be seen as crimes. For example,
studies indicate that the corporate income tax costs more than twice as much to administer as it raises in
revenue. See generally J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring Share-
holder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 352-55 (2005) (characterizing the added costs of certifying financial
statements including tax consultant fees, experts, and internal investigations as opportunity costs of these
compliance activities).
50. See John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corporate Veil: Behind Enron's Fall, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001,
at A]
VOL. 3 NO. 1 2008
WHAT Is A BUSINESS CRIME?
implies a disregard for the interests of others that is akin to malicious destruction
of property. If that were the standard, the prosecutor would need to prove that the
perpetrator had no lawful motivation for his actions. The obvious problem is that
the prosecutor can always make such an assertion by not looking for a lawful moti-
vation. So practically speaking, the burden must be on the defendant to prove a
lawful purpose, or more precisely, to raise a reasonable doubt about the matter."'
Contrast simple insider trading. Insider trading does not usually involve the cre-
ation of any additional harm to investors.5 2 It simply redistributes gains and losses
that would otherwise occur.53 Indeed, it is arguable that insider trading may miti-
gate redistribution problems by helping the market move to the correct price
sooner. It is difficult to see how that should be crime. 4
Criminal sanctions seem appropriate for offenses that involve the creation of
additional harm-collateral damage-and not simply the redistribution or misap-
propriation of wealth.5 Criminal sanctions are not well-suited for situations in
51. Note that a $10 billion increase in market capitalization does not imply $10 billion in new money. So
it might be difficult to prove criminal intent in cases in which it is not clear how to measure collateral damage.
There is a similar problem generally with the federal sentencing guidelines. In some financial fraud cases, the
courts have applied simplistic measures of harm in sentencing. See, e.g., Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220,
224-25 (8th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1971).
52. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487,
1502 (1996). One worry is that the opportunity to trade on inside information may induce corporate actors to
withhold information that is ripe for disclosure. Curiously, relatively few insider trading cases involve insiders
that would be in a position to disclose the information to the market. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1991) (involving insider trading by a former employee); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding
employee of financial printing company guilty of fraud). Indeed, every case that has reached the Supreme
Court has involved an unconventional insider. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (involv-
ing a financial newspaper reporter); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). This suggests that the real worry may be more about keeping secrets than about disclosure. It also
suggests that this crime may be less common in settings where its definition is clear. In any event, it is dis-
turbing that prosecutors seem to focus on the exotic rather than the routine.
53. See Alexander, supra note 52, at 1502.
54. Similarly, securities fraud seldom results in gain to the perpetrators except in cases in which there is
also insider trading. See Booth, End of Securities Fraud, supra note 19, at 9. It is somewhat curious that criminal
enforcement focused almost exclusively on insider trading for so long. The explanation may be that such cases
appeared to be the only cases that involved monetary gain. But that does not explain why prosecutors have not
also pursued churning cases or violations of the 1933 Act.
55. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1863) (stating "the only purpose for which power can right-
fully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"); see
also JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 213 (2d ed. 1960) (1947) ("Harm, in sum, is the
fulcrum between criminal conduct and the punitive sanction ...."); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justifica-
tion: Societal Harm As a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 266-68 (1975) (suggesting
that criminal law punishes conduct that creates harm, but not conduct that produces either benefit or no
harm). It is ironic, but a criminal sanction seems more appropriate if the culprit has little to gain from the
offense relative to the costs imposed on others. If the victim's loss is the culprit's gain, a civil remedy is likely to
be adequate. The idea that the prospect of a monetary penalty should usually suffice to induce appropriate
caution depends to some extent on whether the defendant has something to lose. The implication is that if the
defendant has nothing to lose, there is no incentive for self-control, and criminal sanctions might be necessary.
(As Bob Dylan said, when you got nothing, you got nothing to lose.) This suggests that criminal law is likely to
apply more often to offenses involving poor people. This is not to say that the poor are prosecuted selectively,
but rather that the offenses we criminalize are much more likely to involve poor people than rich people. See,
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which there is real doubt about who is entitled to the gain.56 Money damages
should be the remedy when the harm is such that it can be remedied and deterred
by money damages. As with the law of equity, if there is an adequate remedy at law,
the criminal law should keep out. Indeed, this principle seems to be particularly
well suited to offenses relating to the conduct of business where the ultimate point
is to generate financial return. Where money is the issue, money can fix the
problem.
One (not very good) argument for the use of criminal sanctions is to satisfy
public outrage. 7 The public feels as though someone must be responsible when a
major corporation fails and thousands of people lose their jobs or savings, or both,
particularly if management enjoys a big payday. The obvious response is that we
cannot necessarily depend on public opinion where the offenses are as complex as
e.g., JEFFREY REIMAN.... AND THE POOR GET PRISON: ECONOMIC BIAS IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91-92
(1996) (noting that the incarcerated population is predominantly poor); Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen,
Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 411-13 (2005)
(statistical evidence supports the proposition that poverty has a significant effect on crime); Alice Ristroph,
Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1344 (2006) (crime and
poverty are closely correlated). That seems wrong-or at least impolitic. It also may be a subtle force for
creeping criminalization. If the poor must suffer jail for their offenses, so too should the rich. See J. Scott
Drutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for Harsher Punishment of White-
Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295, 1303, 1312 (2005) (arguing for harsher punishment of white
collar crimes). Compare Jayne O'Donnell & Richard Willing, Prison Time Gets Harder for White-Collar Crooks,
USA TODAY, May 11, 2003, at IA (reporting that after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the Justice Depart-
ment began toughening up on white collar crime), with Howard Gleckman, Where White-Collar Criminals
Belong: Jail, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf2002012
_5188.htm (reporting that, unjustly, white collar criminals are rarely charged, receive short jail sentences, and
are a low priority for the criminal justice system). Although this explanation seems at first to make sense, it
misses a key point of economics: the less you have, the more you value what you have. So one could equally
well argue that criminal sanctions are more important in a situation in which the defendant is likely to be
relatively wealthy. Indeed, one common argument is that in the absence of criminal or quasi-criminal penalties
such as punitive damages, simple compensatory damages will be viewed simply as part of the cost of doing
business. See Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 78-79 (Cal. 2005); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 387-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see also Jonathan Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform
Application of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive Damage Reform, 40
UCLA L. REV. 753, 785 (1993) (explaining that inconsistent punitive damages awards prevent defendants from
factoring such damages into the cost of doing business); O'Donnell & Willing, supra. The odd thing about that
argument is that it is precisely the point of the civil justice system that a business (or an individual for that
matter) will think about externalities as part of the true cost of doing business. Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom,
Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 648, 654-57
(2003). If the point is that paying damages occasionally covers only a small fraction of the costs generated by
the defendant's activities, that is another matter. But the point for present purposes is that the wealth of the
defendant seems to have little to do with whether an offense should be seen as civil or criminal.
56. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 31-33 (arguing that punitive civil sanctions are the most appropriate
sanctions for business crimes).
57. See Meir Dan Cohen, Causation, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 162, 165--66 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983) (discussing the relationship between crime and punishment and society's urge for ven-
geance); Drutcher, supra note 55, at 1311-12.
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they are in the business area. 8 Moreover, prosecutors who have their own agenda
need a fall guy. 9
The public may not have been all that outraged if the failure of Enron had been
explained by a chain reaction involving the misuse of derivatives and falling de-
mand for energy after 9/11. After all, no one went to jail because of the collapse of
Long Term Capital Management. On the other hand, crowds can be wise.6" And it
may be that in the age of derivatives there is no other way to contain the potential
excesses of business than to maintain a vague threat of criminal prosecution based
on know-it-when-you-see-it judgment calls.6'
Another more fundamental problem with a consensus definition of business
crimes is that the interests of investors and managers have diverged in recent years.
Diversified investors want their portfolio companies to maximize stock price.62 Un-
diversified managers would prefer to minimize risk, but they are willing to take
more risk for more pay.63 If undiversified managers fail to take risks that may maxi-
mize the stock price, someone else will assume control-through takeover or oth-
erwise-and do the job. As I have argued elsewhere, the traditional notion of the
CEO as a hired gun who works to maximize stockholder value-because the stock-
holders own the company-is not the only way-or even the best way-to view
the corporation today.64 Why would a CEO work to maximize the wealth of others
without bargaining for a significant share of the gain? So maybe it is better to see
the CEO as an equity partner.6" If we fail to do so and instead continue to raise the
58. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 33.
59. See, e.g., Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 114-15 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that the prosecutor's ambi-
tion "as the man who solved the Kennedy assassination" led to bad faith prosecution and harassment of defen-
dant); Lewis v. Super. Ct., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (involving a prosecutor who was both
implicated in and a victim of the alleged crime); State v. Bell, 370 P.2d 508, 511-12 (Idaho 1962) (involving a
prosecutor was a personal friend of the defendant); City of Maple Heights v. Redi Car Wash, 554 N.E.2d 929,
930 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (disqualifying a prosecutor who had previously filed a libel suit against defendant
and threatened him with additional criminal actions while defendant was testifying); see also Wilt v. Buracker,
443 S.E.2d 196, 211-12 (W. Va. 1993) (Neely, J., concurring) (noting that prosecutors tend to devote greater
resources to pursuing cases that will bring more publicity or resources to the office or advance the prosecutor's
career); Joan McPhee, Corporate Criminal Liability and Punishment in the 21st Century: Departures from Consti-
tutional and Criminal Norms and Anomalies in Practice, ANDREWS WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP., June 29, 2006,
at 1-2.
60. See generally JAMES SUROWEICKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2002).
61. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that fiduciary duty may work in a similar way. Richard A. Booth, The
Missing Link Between Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 185, 187 n.19 (2007). It is also
possible that characterizing Enron as a criminal conspiracy may have been a strategy to divert public attention
from the dangers of derivatives in order to avoid overreaction and overregulation of new ways of doing
business.
62. See Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 155
(2001) [hereinafter Booth, Who Owns].
63. See Meir Statman, The Diversification Puzzle, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 44, 45 (2004).
64. See Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-Manager, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 271-72 [hereinafter Booth, Executive Compensation].
65. See id. at 278; Booth, Who Owns, supra note 62, at 155-56; Charles M. Elson, The Answer to Excessive
Executive Compensation is Risk, Not the Market, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 403, 405 (2007). To be sure, risk-averse
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risk that goes with being publicly held, better managers may opt for private compa-
nies, public investors may be denied better returns, and indeed we may see even
more corporate scandals in the future.66 At the very least, the added risk of criminal
prosecution will likely lead to even higher executive compensation.67
managers should be naturally reluctant to stretch the envelope. So when they do cross the line-wherever it
is-we can be somewhat more confident that the motive was inappropriate.
66. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61. Accord-
ing to Federal Reserve Board (FRB) data, as of year-end 2006 there was outstanding $20.603 trillion in (pub-
licly traded) equity of United States companies, of which $5.483 trillion was held by households and nonprofit
institutions. See FED. RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS OUTSTANDINGS
FOURTH QUARTER 2006, at 90 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.org/releases/zl/20070308/21.pdf
(Figures in Table L.213 do not include investment company shares). Historically, nonprofits have accounted
for about 9 percent of the equity holdings of the household sector. Id. at 109 (showing the annual data for
1988-2000 on Table L.100.a). Assuming that individual holdings equal 91 percent of the household sector (or
about $4.990 trillion), non-individuals-institutions-own about $15.135 trillion or about 76 percent of all equi-
ties outstanding. Id. Because institutions are fiduciaries, they are generally required to diversify under general
principles of trust law or more specific statutes such as the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-5 (2000) (stating that an investment company may not be classified as diversified if it has more than 5
percent of its assets invested in any one issuer); Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)l, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(c) (2000). Thus, it seems fair to presume that institutions are diversified. FRB data also indicates
that about 9.5 percent of families hold fifteen or more stocks. See Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S.
Family Finances: Evidence fron the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006,
at Al, AI5, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf. That is a shock-
ingly low number. See William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Why Do Individual Investors Hold Under-Diversi-
fied Portfolios? 4-6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8686, 2005), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=627321. Nevertheless, if such investors are counted as diversified, total
holdings of diversified investors are about $15.609 trillion. Moreover, individuals ultimately hold the interests
in the institutions that hold diversified portfolios. Studies indicate that an investor can achieve adequate diver-
sification with as few as twenty different stocks. See Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to
Risk and Return, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68 (1974); see also James M. Park & Jeremy C. Staum, Diversification: How
Much is Enough?, I J. ALTERNATIVE INV. 39 (1998). It is unnecessary for present purposes to know how much
diversification is enough. It is sufficient to note that it is costless for an investor to diversify and that the risk of
securities fraud (like other types of company-specific risk) can be eliminated through diversification. See A.C.
Pritchard, O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC: Imputation of Fraud and Optimal Monitoring, 4 Sup. CT. ECON. REV.
179, 182 n.12 (1995); see also The Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A
Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238, 1244 (1979). Most individual investors diversify by investing in
mutual funds and similar pooled investment vehicles. See Peter Fortune, Mutual Funds, Part I: Reshaping the
American Financial System, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1997, at 44, 44-45. Thus, even a very small
investor may invest in a fully diversified portfolio of 200 to 300 different stocks. To be sure, funds charge a
variety of fees in addition to the direct expenses of holding and trading portfolio securities. But there are
comparable fees and expenses involved in maintaining an individual account. Bhattacharya and Galpin find
that in the United States since 2000, about 24 percent of trading is attributable to stock picking whereas about
60 percent was so motivated during the 1960s. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal E. Galpin, The Global Rise of the
Value-Weighted Portfolio (Am. Fin. Assoc. FA 2007 Chi. Meetings Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=849627. They also predict that the level of stock picking will continue to decline
and stabilize at about II percent. Id.
67. See Edward M. lacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489,
505-06 (1998) (discussing the interplay between manager's pay and liability or risk aversion); see also Nathan
Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 502 (2005).
For a general discussion on the effect of risk on executive compensation, see Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A.
Samwick, The Other Side of the Trade-off The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, 107 J. POL. ECON. 65,
67 (1999).
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As a general rule, criminal law should be about offenses that cannot be remedied
or deterred by a monetary penalty, either because the monetary penalty is difficult
or impossible to quantify (as with murder and other crimes involving bodily viola-
tions) or because it appears unlikely to work (as with crimes against property)." As
the Model Penal Code states, the primary goal of criminal law is "to forbid and
prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interests."" To be sure, theft and embezzlement are
crimes about money.7 ° Why do they seem to be appropriate subjects for criminal
prosecution while insider trading and faulty accounting seem less so? One answer is
that these offenses likely cannot be deterred by multiple damages.7' They are take-
the-money-and-run offenses rather than ongoing practices. Another difference is
the participation of the victim. If the victim voluntarily assumes the risk of the
offense (as does a trader or an investor), it is difficult to see the offense as crimi-
nal." Yet another difference is the definition of the offense. If the offense is such
that it may be legal under some circumstances, it is difficult to say that it is a
criminal act under other circumstances, particularly when the prosecutor must
prove the circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt."
68. With most crimes against person and property, the offense is one that could be the subject of a tort
action. But the fact that the offense would give rise to an action for damages seems not to deter the perpetrator.
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985); Steven
Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232,
1236 (1985).
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(a) (Official Draft 1985) (emphasis added).
70. See State v. White, 702 A.2d 1263, 1270 (Md. 1997); Stanley S. Arkin & Mary Louise Guttmann, Types
of Financial Institution Fraud, in BUSINEss CRIME § 20.02 (Stanley S. Arkin with Earl C. Dudley, Jr. et al. eds.,
2007). For a representative list of embezzlement cases, see Arkin & Guttmann, supra at n.29; see also John G.
Douglass, Rethinking Theft Crimes in Virginia, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 13, 16 (2003).
71. See Jeffrey F. Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading, BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCL,
Spring 1974, at 93, 105, 108, 112.
72. See generally Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Crimi-
nal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385 (2005) (discussing how certain affirmative defenses including victims'
actions go toward the determination of "perpetrators' liability"). But see John M. Junker, Criminalization and
Criminogenesis, 19 UCLA L. REV. 697 (1972) (noting that a "consensual" or "victimless" crime should not mean
that criminal law should he ignored). Although the fit may not be perfect, it seems roughly correct to say that if
one cannot buy insurance against an offense, it is not likely to be criminal.
73. There is a real danger that overuse of criminal penalties will reduce the stigma that has traditionally
gone with conviction of a criminal offense. Arguably, that has already occurred in some communities where a
relatively high percentage of the population is incarcerated and jail is just another lifestyle. Joachim J. Savel-
sberg, Controlling Violence: Criminal Justice, Society, and Lessons from the U.S., 30 CRIME, LAw & Soc. CHANGE
185, 191 (1999). As for white collar criminals, Martha Stewart and Mike Milken are both good examples of ex-
cons whose status in the community seems to be little affected.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
RICHARD A. BOOTH
Criminal law is a blunt instrument that carries all-or-nothing penalties." With a
civil action, the plaintiff must plead and prove damages.7" Thus, with civil liability
you know who lost what and who recovers. A prosecutor need not prove dam-
ages." Moreover, a private plaintiff must weigh the costs and benefits of filing a
civil action." In other words, civil remedies are both self-executing and self-regulat-
ing. Indeed, there is little danger that the defendant will pay more than once in a
civil suit, unless the offense is one that calls for punitive damages. In contrast, a
prosecutor has little or no reason not to prosecute an offense other than the pros-
pect of losing. We cannot really expect prosecutors to exercise much discretion
about when (and when not) to prosecute. We should expect that prosecutors will
use the tools they are given. We should assume that a prosecutor will throw the
book at the crook.
74. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker, The Blunt Instrument, in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 71, 74 (William S.
Lofquist et al. eds., 1997) (noting that punishment-one of the functions of criminal law-is a "blunt instru-
ment" and though it may be appropriate in a given circumstance, it is a measure to be avoided). Further, efforts
to make criminal law more scalable--such as the federal sentencing guidelines-seem only to have made
matters worse. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1326 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that " [e]very attempt
to make the system of sentences 'more rational' carries costs and concealed irrationalities, both loopholes and
unanticipated severity"), afftd, 500 U.S. 453 (1990); United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1081-82 (D.
Utah 1990) (discussing "the exercise of police and court discretion in relation to the aims of our criminal
justice system"), affd, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection after United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1080
n.33 (1997).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). See generally 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 703 (2007).
76. See Damages, supra note 75. As Gordon Gekko, the fictional character in the movie Wall Street, might
have said, "the need to quantify the stakes clears the mind and focuses the will." See WALL STREET (20th
Century Fox 1987).
77. See BUREAU OF INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OUTLINE OF THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 118,
127 (2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/legalotln/legalotln.pdf.
78. The bigger worry is a staff with too little to do. Cf Poulin, supra note 74, at 1085 (noting that prosecu-
tors bring their own personal biases to their work and are often guided loosely, if at all, in making decisions
regarding what crimes to prosecute).
79. Although one can only pay once in a civil action, one is likely to pay (so to speak) several times over in
a criminal action. To be sure, in cases in which criminal prosecution is appropriate, there always will be a
potential for lesser included civil remedies and accordingly a proliferation of actions. That seems unavoidable.
See BUREAU OF INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, supra note 77, at 120. But it suggests that prosecutors should not
concern themselves with compensation. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 837, 860-62 (noting that some commentators endorse prosecutorial neutrality and specifically
assert that prosecutors should maintain independence from victims and their families, and the decisions they
make in prosecution should be "indifferent[ J to the preferences and objectives of interested third parties"). But
see Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimi-
zation in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CAL. L. REV. 727, 734 (1988) (suggesting that court initiated
prosecution would provide victims with the most appropriate remedy). This is not to excuse the senseless
destruction of Arthur Andersen. See generally George J. Benston & Al L. Hartgraves, Enron: What Happened
and What We Can Learn from It, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 105 (2002) (discussing the history of Arthur
Andersen, the long-time accounting firm of Enron that was charged criminally and had civil suits filed against
it for its role in Enron's collapse). Likewise, studies indicate that the corporate income tax is very costly to
administer. See generally MICHAEL L. MARLOw, A PRIMER ON THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: INCIDENCE, EFFI-
CIENCY AND EQUITY ISSUES 1 (2001), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/fa408l493fl5dla41c6bl 
02917010e9.pdf (noting that "[elconomists have estimated that for every dollar collected by the federal govern-
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Accordingly, it is important to be certain about a crime and its definition. Again,
the Model Penal Code is instructive. Another express goal of criminal law is to "give
fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense."8 If an
offense is hard to define or the definition seems to shift with changing circum-
stances, it is not a good idea to make it a crime. In other words, we should only
make an offense a crime if it is a crime all the time. Indeed, a good rule would be
that unless we can say that conduct or behavior is always wrong-unless we can
construct a definition that draws a bright line for all to see-we should eschew the
creation of criminal penalties. The alternative is to depend on prosecutors both to
define crimes and to prosecute them.'
III. WHY THE (RECENT) EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL LAW?
Over the long haul, criminal law seems to have receded. There are no debtor pris-
ons or workhouses nowadays. And few would argue that it is a crime to sell a stock
short or charge usurious interest.82 Any suggestion that we should recriminalize
these offenses-let alone simple breach of contract cases-would be positively me-
dieval. Nevertheless, some of the high profile cases of the early 2000s could be
characterized as an attack on limited liability albeit as it applies to publicly traded
ment through the corporate income tax, an additional one and a half dollar's worth of economic resources are
consumed").
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(l)(d) (1985).
81. Needless to say, there always will be the problem of derivative offenses such as obstruction of justice. It
is difficult to argue that obstruction of justice should not be a crime. But see Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the Federal Ob-
struction ofjustice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 601-05 (1992) (arguing that the interpretation of the intent
requirement of the Neisweinder obstruction of justice doctrine goes too far and allows criminal prosecution of
negligent acts that should not be classified as obstruction of justice). It also is apparent that obstruction of
justice and similar charges have been used in some cases to prosecute offenders who were not even charged
with any other offense. Martha Stewart, Arthur Andersen, and Frank Quattrone come to mind. See Kathleen F.
Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 258-60 (2004) (stating "lalnother set of concerns about the
fraud prosecutions relates to which cases prosecutors have chosen to pursue"). Brickey notes that in the Martha
Stewart, Arthur Andersen, and Frank Quattrone cases, prosecutors pursued the easier to prove obstruction of
justice charges. Id. at 258-59. It is difficult to imagine a case in which obstruction alone should be a crime.
Then again it is also a crime to escape from jail. To be sure, there are some offenses such as bribing a judge or
juror that quite clearly seem to be criminal and that would also constitute obstruction of justice. But it is
difficult to believe that such offenses cannot be defined with more precision. See Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur
Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality Be an Element of Obstruction of Justice?, 44 WASHBURN
L.J. 583, 584, 600-01(2005) (suggesting that judges and prosecutors "factor in an element of 'materiality,' as
required for proof of obstruction of justice, when prosecutors can proceed with the underlying conduct they
were investigating, but fail to do so upon realizing possible obstructive conduct"). In other words, obstruction
(like the offense of quibbling in military schools) seems to be the product of lazy legislators who have nothing
to gain (and everything to lose) from not being tough on crime.
82. And the practice that was formerly known as payola is now known as product placement. Some com-
mentators would, however, argue that short-selling in certain situations should be redressed by restitution. See
Moin A. Yahya, The Law & Economics of"Sue and Dump": Should Plaintiffs' Attorneys Be Prohibited from Trad-
ing the Stock of Companies They Sue?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 425, 460-61 (2006) (arguing that a defendant
should be entitled to restitution when plaintiff's attorneys short sell stock in a company that they are about to
sue because the short sellers profit doubly from the sale of the stock and the proceeds of the lawsuit).
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companies. 3 To be a bit more precise, it has become increasingly common for
bankruptcy to give rise to criminal charges."4 While some cases have focused on
creditors as victims, 5 most other cases have focused on stockholders as victims.
8 6
Thus, it would seem that the goal of the prosecutors in these cases has been to
vindicate the harm suffered by stockholders (including employee stockholders),
though there may well have been other creditors harmed in the process. Again,
because there is no plaintiff other than the government, and because the prosecu-
tion need not plead and prove damages in any concrete way, it is difficult to discern
the ultimate goal in these criminal proceedings, though it seems quite clear that the
stockholders are seen as an important class of victims.8 7
It is not at all clear that stockholders need or want such favors. In the aggregate
and over time, business makes profits and investors enjoy positive returns.88 A well-
diversified stockholder wants portfolio companies to seek maximum returns. It
does not matter if a few portfolio companies go bankrupt trying. Others will exceed
expectations. It all comes out in the wash. If there is reason to believe that a pub-
licly traded corporation has been operated for the primary purpose of defrauding
investors and not in a good faith effort to turn a profit, then criminal prosecution
may be appropriate. But no one has suggested any such thing about Enron,
WorldCom, or any other recent case.
It may be that much of the growth of the criminal law in this setting is a result of
problems with civil remedies. Federal securities law provides that a willful violation
83. See Brickey, supra note 81, at 222 ("CORPORATION, n. An ingenious device for obtaining individual
profit without individual responsibility."). Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications, Rite Aid, Symbol
Technologies, Qwest Communications, Dynegy and HealthSouth all were organized as corporations known for
their limited liability. Id. at 225-28. The prosecution of these organizations are attacks on limited liability in
the context of publicly traded companies.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Milwitt, 475 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (overturning a conviction for
bankruptcy fraud because there was not sufficient evidence to prove specific intent); United States v. Wagner,
382 F.3d 598, 613-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a reasonable trier of fact could have found sufficient evi-
dence to support the conviction for bankruptcy fraud).
85. For example, the Enron debacle has given rise to numerous actions against banks and other financial
institutions that facilitated fraudulent transactions. See Brickey, supra note 81, at 253, 257-58 (listing the
parallel civil and criminal proceedings against Enron; and also listing the criminal defendants in Enron-related
prosecutions).
86. Cf. Douglas A. Henry, Comment, Subordinating Subordination: WorldCorn and the Effects of Sarbanes-
Oxley's Fair eFunds Provision on Distributions in Bankruptcy, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 259, 295-96 (2004)
(noting that the WorldCom decision raised the claims of shareholders to be even with the claims of creditors).
87. But see Brickey, supra note 81, at 276 (noting that federal prosecution under SOX has made significant
progress towards "pinning responsibility on all culpable parties .... working up the corporate hierarchy to
charge the highest blameworthy executives"). Moreover, there have been few if any cases of note involving large
privately held companies, further suggesting that prosecutors are focused on the stockholders of publicly traded
companies as the supposed victims. Limited liability always has been an uncertain benefit for very small com-
panies. Although it is not easy to pierce the corporate veil in many jurisdictions, such cases are quite common,
presumably because creditors succeed often enough.
88. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (recognizing that "[a] business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders .... [tlhe discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end").
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is a crime. The statutes also provide for civil enforcement by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as private civil actions under the 1933 Act. To
complicate matters further, the courts have implied a broad private remedy under
the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.89 The courts recognized long ago that securities fraud
litigation can be abusive.9" Because investors may sue whenever they lose, investor
protection can morph into investor insurance. Thus, in 1976 the Supreme Court
ruled that to state a claim under Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff must plead and prove
scienter.9" And in 1980 the Court ruled that the SEC must meet the same stan-
dard. 2 Thereafter, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act93
(PSLRA), which raised the bar for pleading scienter (among other things),94 fol-
lowed by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act9" (SLUSA), which pre-
vented such actions from migrating to state courts.96 The bottom line is that the
standard of pleading and proof in a criminal proceeding is lower than in a civil
proceeding. Clearly, something is awry.
One problem is with the idea that an investor should have standing to assert a
direct claim for damages in connection with a misstatement or omission that af-
fects the trading market. To be sure, an investor has a direct claim against the issuer
in the context of an offering by the issuer. But that is because the issuer took
money from the investor and should give it back if the investor was misled. The
situation is completely different if the issuer misleads the market outside the con-
text of an offering. The market price of the stock is bound to move when the truth
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). There is also an express private cause of action under section 18(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000) (creating the right that a person knowingly
misleading "shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in
reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such
statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith
and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading"). But because this remedy requires that the
investor prove that he relied on a false statement in a document filed with the SEC-and is thus much nar-
rower than Rule lOb-5-it is seldom invoked. See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and
Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 1ob-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 399 (1995) (noting that
section 18 has a specific requirement of reliance whereas Rule 10(b) does not, which has resulted in courts
reading a more flexible reliance standard into Rule 10(b)). But see Lindner Dividend Fund, Inc. v. Ernst &
Young, 880 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that the purchasers of preferred stock satisfied the require-
ment for stating cause of action under Securities Exchange Act section 18(a) when their loss caused by their
reliance was subject to challenge was not so unsupportable that the cause of action should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim).
90. It also is well recognized that simple civil remedies do not work well in connection with insider
trading. So Congress enacted Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and then Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. See Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.); Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Star. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
91. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
92. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
93. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)).
94. id.
95. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb).
96. Id.
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comes out. The loss must fall somewhere. To afford a remedy to investors who
happen to buy or sell at the wrong time is only to rearrange the gains and losses.97
On the other hand, if insiders use the opportunity to extract gains by trading at a
time when they know that the market is misinformed, outside investors suffer to
the extent that the insiders gain.9" The upshot is that diversified investors have
nothing to gain from filing a securities fraud action except when insider misappro-
priation is involved.99 Even then, investors can be made whole if the issuer recovers
the insider gains.' ° In other words, investors would prefer that securities fraud
actions be limited to an action by the company (or a derivative action) to recover
insider gains. The problem is that the existing system of direct recovery by individ-
ual investors who happen to buy or sell at the wrong time is nothing more than a
transfer of wealth among investors, less substantial attorney fees.' Investors gain
nothing in the end. Indeed they lose to the extent of the costs of litigation. But
plaintiffs attorneys (and maybe even defense attorneys) have a big stake in the
system as it stands."2
There is a certain twisted logic in the expansion of criminal prosecution when
civil remedies are in such disarray. A securities fraud class action is potentially
devastating for a target company.'0 3 Indeed, at least one study has found that 30
percent of target companies end up bankrupt.'0 4 So it is understandable for a target
company to circle the wagons. It is unlikely that a company (or its board of direc-
tors) will seek out those who misled the market or even those who may have traded
at a gain during the fraud period.'00 It is also understandable that the courts and
Congress have sought to limit the reach of private securities litigation.'0 6 But it is
almost comical that they have done so in effect by telling plaintiffs lawyers that
97. See Booth, End of Securities Fraud, supra note 19, at 3-4.
98. Id. at 4.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 24.
101. Id. at 3 n.2.
102. Id.
103. See SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 42, at 14.
104. See id.; ANJAN V. THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION app. II, exhibit A (Oct. 26,
2005) (noting plaintiff attorney fees of $1.7 billion in connection with settlements totaling $11.9 billion in a
sample of 482 class actions). Assuming that this sample is representative of the percentage of settlements
awarded as plaintiff's attorney fees (approximately 14 percent in the sample), a good estimate of the total
plaintiff attorney fees awarded in Securities Fraud Class Actions (SFCAs) since 1995 is $3.6 billion (14 percent
of $26 billion). Assuming that defendant firms have been paid roughly the same amount, it seems a fair
estimate that SFCAs have generated about $7 billion in attorney fees over the last ten years. Defendant firms are
paid in all cases, whether or not the plaintiff prevails, but presumably defendant firm fees are a good deal less
than plaintiff firm fees in cases in which plaintiffs prevail. Note that plaintiff attorney fees are paid out of the
settlement and that accordingly, the estimated amount available for investors was $26 billion less $3.6 billion,
or about $22.4 billion. Id.
105. See Booth, End of Securities Fraud, supra note 19, at 7.
106. See id. at 28-29 n.78.
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they may sue only if they really have the facts that will support the claim. 7 The
problem is not that plaintiff lawyers are too eager. The problem is that the remedy
is too generous and not rationally related to the harm suffered by investors. It is
thus not surprising that prosecutors have swept in to fill the near vacuum created
by ever narrower private remedies and companies that cannot afford to be candid.
The simple solution is for the courts to recharacterize securities fraud class ac-
tions as derivative actions. As I have argued elsewhere, this would be more consis-
tent with the statutory scheme than the current system of securities fraud class
actions.' For example, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides for issuer recovery
in connection with short-swing trading (which is essentially a variety of insider
trading). 9 Moreover, the law of insider trading is founded primarily on the idea
that an insider has a duty to the source of the information (usually the issuer) not
to use the information for personal gain. So it seems quite clear that the issuer has
standing to recover. And indeed there is solid state law precedent to that effect."'
CONCLUSION
Disputes relating to corporate governance and securities regulation are singularly
bad subject matter for criminal sanctions. The issues of corporation law come in
many forms ranging from self-dealing, to corporate opportunity, to executive com-
pensation, to simple mismanagement. And as for federal securities regulation, the
question is almost always one of where the gain and loss should fall. Either way, the
issue is ultimately one of distribution. The civil law does not presume any answers
other than to allocate the burden of proof to one party or the other depending on
the nature of the allegations. In contrast, the criminal law is one dimensional. Al-
though the defendant is supposedly presumed innocent, the issue for the court in a
criminal case is a simple factual one: Did the defendant do the crime? Although
there may be some cases of outright fraud in which the perpetrator has made no
good faith effort to run a profitable business, most cases of business failure are
otherwise. A diversified stockholder is perfectly able (and indeed happy) to absorb
the occasional loss from the failure of a business if management tries in good faith
to maximize stockholder value. As long as management does not have its hand in
107. The PSLRA requires that a plaintiff allege facts that support a strong inference of scienter. See Tellabs,
Inc., v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506-12 (2007).
108. See Booth, End of Securities Fraud, supra note 19, at 28.
109. Id; see also 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation - Federal § 1415 (2007).
110. It is arguable that the creation of a claim for the benefit of contemporaneous traders under the ITSFEA
preempts claims by the issuer. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). But claims under section 20A
depend on proof of another independent violation of federal securities law. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated in part by 127 S. Ct. 2499. A claim under section
20A is not based on any duty to the source of the information. So it is difficult to see how such a claim could
displace an issuer claim based on traditional notions of fiduciary duty. ITSFEA is an example of rampant
confusion in federal securities law.
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the cookie jar, gains will more than compensate for losses. The threat of criminal
prosecution will likely cause better managers to be more conservative than stock-
holders want, and to seek more pay, or to go to work for privately held companies.
Either way, investors lose. So if the issue is stockholder welfare, we should rein in
the prosecutors somehow. If the issue is something else, somebody should say what
it is.
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